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The Total Operations Management for Safety Critical Activities 
(TOSCA) project is aimed at developing a safety management 
framework that integrates best practices, tools and methods for 
functional analysis, risk assessment, interactive emergency 
scenarios analysis, performance monitoring, design review, 
training and knowledge management. The TOSCA approach is 
described by a T-model based around a central ‘Common 
Operational Picture’ (COP) that holds information regarding the 
operational system, and is used to support risk assessment and 
management. The information held in the COP may be represented 
in different ways but should be accessible to all stakeholders in 
order to analyse and communicate risk, and to support training and 
procedure design. 
Total Safety Management  
Over the recent past, the accumulation of major mishaps, crises and accidents 
have made it clear that organisations must still improve their capabilities to 
address safety not as a stand-alone activity that is separate from the main 
activities and processes of the organisation but as an integrated part of total 
performance management. Total Safety Management uses the basis of Total 
Quality Management to drive safety within an organisation (Herrero et al, 2002), 
but in contrast to quality management, Total Safety Management influences 
performance, quality and safety resulting in a much wider beneficial effect 
(Cooper & Phillips, 1995).  
It is essential that we understand how weaknesses in the technical processes 
combine with flaws in organisational interfaces and give rise to significant losses 
and major industrial accidents. The traditional fields of practice, such as risk 
analysis (RA) and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), have often been rooted 
in simplified accident models and failed to conduct a functional analysis that 
takes into account any dependencies between technical, human and 
organisational processes. In addition, traditional RAs and PSAs have not 
provided robust solutions because they have not been embedded within a ‘total 
operations’ or ‘performance management’ framework to deliver solutions that 
are both innovative and safe. It is not sufficient that production systems are 
reliable (i.e., their failure probability is acceptably low) but they must also be 
resilient and capable of recovering from irregular variations, disruptions and 
degradation of working conditions. It is often the case that system vulnerability 
and resilience arise from the same interactions between socio-technical 
dimensions. Thus, the mechanisms that create vulnerabilities and resilience cut 
across traditional disciplinary borders, e.g., engineering, sociology, psychology 
and political science. 
In the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in occupational health 
and safety in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) accompanied by many 
European projects supporting their viability (see European Agency for Safety 
and Health at Work Report 2005).  The majority of studies in the literature have 
found that SMEs have an increased risk of accidents compared to large 
enterprises. However, Sørensen et al. (2007) found that this relationship only 
holds for SMEs that are independent; in contrast, for SMEs that are part of larger 
organizations, the work environment does not seem to present more hazards than 
the large enterprises. Another survey  conducted in Italy (i.e., 84 small-sized and 
25 medium-sized enterprises responded to a questionnaire) reported on the 
importance of SMEs’ perception of safety and identified current safety 
management priorities and methods. Micheli and Cagno (2009) found that, 
although 80% of SMEs claimed that safety was among their main priorities, they 
reported problems in planning safety interventions because of limited financial 
resources, lack of management tools and a burden of compliance with 
regulations and codes.  SMEs focused their investments on issues associated 
with purely regulatory or legislative aspects, that is, (1) training and information 
of workers on safety, (2) upgrading installations to comply with safety standards, 
and (3) introducing safer production technologies and personal protective 
equipment. A tendency was observed among SMEs to outsource safety 
management to compensate for the lack of specific competences within the 
enterprise; this tendency was greater in small-sized enterprises. Therefore, SMEs 
can gain a lot of benefits in safety and performance by developing a capacity to 
risk assess actual operations with a practical and resilient methodology as well as 
a capacity for monitoring operational data in a solution embedded in their 
everyday data collection process. 
The Total Operations Management for Safety Critical Activities (TOSCA) 
project is a European Project within the context of the 7th Framework Program 
aimed at developing an innovative approach to integrate and enhance safety, 
quality and productivity, especially for SMEs in the process industry. The scope 
of TOSCA is to establish an economically suitable framework in which the most 
innovative tools and techniques (e.g. advanced 3D software, virtual reality, 
innovative theoretical models, updated information exchange protocols, etc.) are 
used together in order to take advantage of possible synergies in processing 
human factors requirements, fulfilling regulations, improving safety and 
enhancing productivity.  
To achieve this, the project is developing a theoretical framework for Total 
Safety Management in the process industry, particularly focused on SME 
applications. The aim is to better define and highlight the needs of the industry 
regarding the development of an integrated methodology for assessing safety, 
quality and operations management.  
Safety Management 
Safety management has traditionally focused on correcting safety concerns, 
problems, or hazards and taking the necessary steps to bring the system back to 
normal operation. Existing safety approaches seem to rely on what is commonly 
known as closed-loop feedback control.  Therefore, we need to develop a new 
approach that not only solves out discrepancies between safety goals and current 
states but also helps us understand the current state of operations and risks 
involved in a plant. If stakeholders are able to develop a common picture of 
operations and risks then they are in a better position to anticipate the effects of 
corrective actions and risk mitigations.  In order to develop this anticipatory or 
proactive capability, our safety approach should rely on an internal model of the 
process that predicts the future state of the process and compares alternative 
actions in terms of effectiveness and cost. This type of model-driven feedback 
control enables safety analysts to cope with an overload of information and direct 
attention to critical events in a timely fashion. Safety practitioners should be able 
to monitor what could become a threat in the near-term and what could impair 
their abilities to respond (internal performance). This monitoring capability is 
supported by a common picture of how the technical process works, how people 
organize their jobs and how the environment can affect the process and the 
people.  
 
Several activities that are critical from a safety or productivity perspective may 
require a strong coordination between many agents (e.g., safety managers, 
supervisors, operators and external contractors) as well as communication of 
information regarding possible side-effects, threats and escalation of events.  
This ‘knowledge transformation’ process requires that data and information are 
systematically managed and integrated with people’s knowledge of the 
functioning of the system.   Building a common picture of opportunities and 
threats will allow different agents to understand the systemic causes of safety 
issues and provide a basis for suggesting practical interventions.   
 
The requirements for safety management in existing and upcoming standards and 
regulations (example ISO 31000 and its related upcoming revisions, Seveso II 
directive etc.) call for a proactive strategic approach, demonstrating a capacity to 
anticipate risks and keep safety at the centre of changes driven by commercial 
competition as well as ensuring that evidence collected through risk analysis 
becomes an effective driver of innovation and change. This is particularly 
important for Major Hazardous Activities where prevention and mitigation are 
necessary for survival and where the complexity of organizations requires a 
‘system of systems’ perspective. However, there is currently a gap between the 
principles stated in the available standards and regulations and the actual 
roadmaps to their implementation. Organisations, especially the safety critical 
ones, find it difficult to integrate their different functional units in a common 
programme of operations management. 
COMPRIS 
A Common Operational Picture is a single source, usually a display, of relevant 
operational information. The term originates from the military domain where it is 
used to describe the complete graphical picture of the battlefield used by 
commanders to make effective command decisions (Looney, 2001). The aim of a 
common operational picture is to share situation awareness among distributed 
stakeholders and the concept has also been applied in emergency management 
and humanitarian crisis management (McNeese et al, 2006). TOSCA applies this 
concept to safety management, and is developing a Common Operations 
Management and Risk Information System (COMPRIS). COMPRIS provides a 
representation of information and knowledge about the operational system that 
can be used to support risk assessment and safety management. The information 
may be represented in different ways, but should be accessible to all stakeholders 
involved in a project in order to analyse and communicate risk, and to support 
training and job design.  
 
In terms of control theory, COMPRIS is a ‘mental model of how the system 
works’ that guides the application of a safety management system (SMS) in 
everyday practice. In this respect, COMPRIS is a ‘mental model’ of how a 
specific SMS works, what risks are significant at a particular area, what methods 
should be used to assess risks, what uncertainties exist in a risk evaluation, and 
what risk mitigation measures can be chosen to reduce risk to acceptable levels.  
 
Establishing COMPRIS, or a ‘risk picture’, involves a useful synthesis of the risk 
assessment, with the intention to provide understandable information to the 
relevant decision-makers and users about the risk and the risk assessment 
performed.  The ‘risk picture’ shall be understandable by all relevant personnel, 
decision makers as well as engineering and/or operating personnel. This may be 
achieved with the use of tailored documentation and presentations to different 
groups of internal and external stakeholders. The presentation and documentation 
of the risk picture shall be a comprehensive, balanced, many-facetted and holistic 
picture of the risk associated with facilities and operations.  
 
COMPRIS is an internal model that addresses how safety is measured and what 
‘performance indicators’ will be monitored to measure not only the ‘final 
outcome’ but also ‘antecedents’ so that changes are made before undesired 
outcomes are produced.  Performance indicators provide a good basis for 
integrating measures of safety with productivity and quality control. Figure 1 
shows s model-driven safety management system that comprise four functions 
from resilience engineering (i.e., REPOND – MONITOR - ANTICIPATE and 
LEARN): 
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Figure 1: The role of COMPRIS within a safety management system 
1. Given a specified safety goal, the safety practitioner has to RESPOND 
take control action that changes the technical process in order to 
produce the desired output; in turn this is measured by suitable indexes 
and by feedback (MONITOR).  
2. COMPRIS (i.e., the internal model of the process) also needs to enable 
safety practitioners to ANTICIPATE disturbances so that actions are 
taken before they occur. The advantage here is that control actions can 
prevent adverse events from taking place or intervene before their 
consequences have had time to spread to other parts. 
3. Safety practitioners must be also able to control threats from internal 
variability due to fatigue of personnel, changes in team composition, 
unavailability of tools and so forth.   
4. Safety practitioners must be able to LEARN from experience which 
includes many changes in the internal model of the process. 
 
Individual companies have different approaches to building their ‘understanding 
of risks and risk control measures’ depending on the resources invested in safety 
management. SMEs may have greater problems than large companies in getting 
an accurate ‘COMPRIS’ (or ‘understanding’) of their risks and the possible 
measures to control risks. Among other reasons, SMEs are more diversified than 
large companies and this makes it difficult to draw on what risk information 
already exists in the specific industry domain they operate. There is a need 
therefore to examine the scope of COMPRIS in both SMEs and large companies. 
 
 
 
Application of COMPRIS 
 
There is limited information  on ‘what constitutes a common operational picture’ 
in a SMS. There has been a tendency to consider the ‘risk registry’ and the ‘risk 
acceptance criteria’ as a common operating picture so that all stakeholders and 
operators are aware of the whole spectrum of risks in a company. However, it is 
interesting to ask whether the common picture should also address the risk 
analysis tools used to identify risks, their limitations, the kind of analysts 
participated in the risk analysis, and the influence of the conditions under which 
the analysis took place. Other issues concern the level of detail that should be 
presented about risk items such as, the description of risks, the possible risk 
control measures, the responsible persons etc. Different people have their own 
boundaries of responsibility and it becomes time consuming to consider any 
‘risks’ in other areas beyond their responsibilities. We can view the common 
operational picture as a database of risk information that should be accessible to 
key players but ‘who should see what information’ remains a challenging issue 
to be resolved. In TOSCA a set of methods and tools are used to establish the 
COMPRIS and produce a robust risk assessment (Fig. 2). These include: 
• Task design and high-level functional hazard analysis using a 
participatory approach. This can be achieved with a modified Business 
Process Modelling (BPM) approach. 
• Operational risk screening in order to feed in the results of functional 
analysis into bow-tie diagrams to identify important technical and 
human barriers that prevent or control industrial hazards.  
• Quantified risk assessment for complex scenarios using tools, such as 
traditional fault trees or computational fluid dynamics, for consequence 
and likelihood assessment. 
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Figure 2: TOSCA methods and tools to establish COMPRIS  
The results of risk analysis can be tested in workplace prototyping tools that 
create virtual workplaces for operators to interact with planned designs or 
changes in a 3D virtual representation. 3D maps of the site can also be used to 
display risk information in an accessible format, including critical risk areas and 
key safety barriers. Many SMEs complain that risk assessment is a complicated 
process that can be done only once during the design stage. Updating the risk 
assessment process every time there is a change management program is very 
cumbersome. For this reason, TOSCA builds a tool for managing and visualizing 
safety knowledge. Finally, TOSCA builds a risk registry for collecting data, 
monitoring risks and communicating safety knowledge. The risk registry is based 
on the concept of building a ‘business case for safety’ where the values of safety 
are seen beyond the traditional reduction of risks to establish connections with 
quality and productivity. 
Current applications and future developments.  
The TOSCA T-model © describes the Common Operational Picture at the heart 
of TOSCA safety management, and links this picture to a design loop and an 
operational loop (Fig. 3).  The design loop applies the TOSCA tools to the 
design of new plant sections, the management of technical and organizational 
changes, and the risk analysis of critical activities.  The operational loops applies 
the methods and tools to the management of safety barriers, the design of 
workflows, coordination of teams, and training. Modular products to deliver 
safety management are under development for each area of the framework 
 
 
Figure 3: TOSCA Total Safety Management Framework© 
 
To follow up the development and the testing of the TOSCA methodology in the 
three main sections and the deployment of the tools to support it within the 
project we have currently chosen to develop five test beds to test the 
effectiveness of the proposed approaches in the areas identified. The test beds 
include the use of process mapping and task analysis to improve risk assessments 
for a food processing organisation, the establishment of a risk register and a set 
of KPIs to support hazard identification and risk monitoring in a energy 
generation company, the development of a 3D risk map to be used as a 
knowledge and risk management system for a company producing fertilizers, the 
use of rapid prototyping to optimise a rare testing procedure for a LPG storage 
organisation, and the use of VR to review and train operators and contractors for 
loading and unloading of cryogenic liquids. Three of the test beds will be 
conducted in SMEs, allowing the TOSCA approach to be tailored and tested for 
small enterprises as well as large ones. The results of the first phase of testing 
will be used to refine the individual tools and techniques deployed, as well as the 
overall approach and the concept of COMPRIS. 
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